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In October 2009 an Australian customs boat, the Oceanic Viking, sat in an 
Indonesian port for three weeks waiting for a decision to be made about 
the fate of the 78 Sri Lankans on board. The Australian Prime Minister had 
asked, and the Indonesian President had agreed, that the asylum seekers 
be processed in Indonesia. Neither side anticipated the response of local 
authorities, who vehemently opposed the arrangement, accusing their 
own and the Australian governments of using their province as a dumping 
ground. This development added an extra level of complexity to an 
already complicated situation in which senior Indonesian bureaucrats had 
obstructed the implementation of the agreement and asylum seekers refused 
to disembark. This paper chronicles the unfolding of the crisis, arguing that 
its resolution depended on interplay of both Australian and Indonesian 
processes and exploring the implications of the crisis for the regional 
elements of the Rudd government’s policy on asylum seekers, which relied 
on the co-operation of countries where asylum seekers transit en route to 
Australia. Highlighting the limitations of bilateral co-operation in this area, 
this essay reveals the pressure on Australia’s political leadership to find for 
alternative solutions in the region.1
Whither with the Oceanic Viking
The Oceanic Viking rescued a group of Sri Lankan asylum seekers on 18 
October 2009 in Indonesia’s search and rescue zone. The distress call was 
picked up by Indonesian authorities who then asked Australia to assist. 
Australia’s HMAS Armidale instructed the Oceanic Viking, a ship contracted 
to Customs in the area at the time, to inspect the vessel. Upon arrival, 
Australian customs officials found that the crew had deserted the boat 
and its passengers. Reports suggest that the crew had drilled holes in the 
hull and damaged the rudder before leaving the ship. In accordance with 
its bilateral search and rescue agreement with Indonesia, the Australian 
government transferred the passengers to the Oceanic Viking and began 
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deliberations on where the passengers should be set ashore. Amendments 
to the Safety of Life at Sea and Search and Rescue conventions require the 
country with responsibility for the search and rescue zone to ensure that a 
‘place of safety’ is provided.2 However, Indonesia is not a signatory to this 
convention, and Australian governments have not always been successful 
in convincing the Indonesian government that it is responsible for asylum 
seekers who depart from Indonesian ports and are subsequently rescued at 
sea. 
In the absence of a solid international framework, Australia has sought 
greater clarity about Indonesia’s role in the Indian Ocean through bilateral 
agreements such as the 2004 Arrangement for Coordination of Search and 
Rescue Services, which demarcates the spaces for which Australia and 
Indonesia are responsible. Acknowledging the presence of Australian 
territory in the Indonesian zone, the treaty also requires Australia to assist 
Indonesia in its efforts to perform search and rescue operations. Australian 
authorities provide information to Indonesian authorities about the location 
of vessels in distress, help secure the commitment of privately owned vessels 
to render assistance, and have also reportedly repaired boats at sea. In line 
with with the stipulations of the Search and Rescue Convention, Indonesia’s 
Ministry of Transport permits these vessels to dock in Indonesian territory. 
In addition, Australian and Indonesian authorities have agreed that 
Indonesia will allow those rescued in its search and rescue area to alight in 
Indonesian territory regardless of their migration status. It was thus never 
a question for the Australian government about whether or not the 78 Sri 
Lankans on board the Oceanic Viking should be landed in Indonesia. Rather, 
it was a question of which port.
However, the Oceanic Viking was not just any boat. It was an Australian 
government vessel. This meant that Indonesia’s Ministry of Transport could 
not issue port clearance, which required permission from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. As a result, the Oceanic Viking remained in the rescue area 
for almost three days while Australian and Indonesian authorities negotiated 
the fate of the asylum seekers. When Prime Minister Rudd attended the 
Presidential inauguration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on 20 October in 
Jakarta, he met with Yudhoyono to discuss how the case should be handled 
and obtained a verbal agreement that the Sri Lankans could disembark 
in Indonesia. In return, he promised to cover the cost of accommodating 
and processing them as well as providing more funding for intelligence, 
interceptions and the construction of facilities to bolster Indonesia’s 
capacity to control people smuggling within its territory. Rudd announced 
the agreement to the Australian Parliament on 21 October as Yudhoyono 
instructed the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to co-ordinate the roles 
each state body should play in the reception and processing of the asylum 
seekers.
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Some senior officials in the Indonesian Ministry of Justice and Human 
Rights disapproved of the Rudd–Yudhoyono agreement, but the Oceanic 
Viking was given clearance to dock in Merak Port on 22 October. In response, 
the regional office of the Ministry in Merak made public statements about 
the limited capacity of the area’s detention facilities to accommodate 
more asylum seekers. The District Head also raised this issue in the 
media. Criticisms centred on the central government’s failure to take into 
account that there were 255 asylum seekers in the port who had refused to 
disembark until they met with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) to discuss the prioritisation of their claims. Their boat, 
the Jaya Lestari, had been intercepted in Indonesian waters by Indonesia on 
instruction from Australia under the bilateral framework for controlling 
Australia-bound people smuggling. Under this agreement, Indonesia was 
responsible for detaining ships that do not fulfil legal requirements for 
passage through, or carriage of passengers within, Indonesian territory. 
However, the Indonesian and Australian governments at this time had not 
yet discussed the possibility of transporting asylum seekers picked up in 
international waters to Indonesian ports on Australian-flagged ships.
The Oceanic Viking remained anchored in Merak Port for two days but on 24 
October was redirected by Indonesia to the Riau Islands, east of Sumatra and 
south of Singapore, where the Australian government had partially funded 
the construction of detention facilities for unlawful migrants. When it 
became clear that they were going to be processed in Indonesia, male asylum 
seekers went on a hunger strike. A large number of passengers already held 
UNHCR documents attesting their claim to refugee status and, frustrated 
by the lengthy resettlement process, had attempted to pursue those claims 
in Australia. Indonesia and Malaysia do not accord asylum seekers a unique 
migration status, treating them instead as unlawful migrants. Unlawful 
migrants risk arrest and detention, and in Malaysia also fines and corporal 
punishment. By contrast, Australia is signatory to the refugee conventions 
and—although asylum seekers are detained and often treated badly—has 
mechanisms in place to prevent asylum seekers from being treated as 
unlawful migrants. Partly motivated by the influential discourse about 
‘queue jumpers’, which dominates the debate around asylum seekers in 
Australia, the Rudd government refused to entertain the demands of the 
Oceanic Viking asylum seekers to be processed in Australia, but promised 
that Australia would intervene to expedite the resettlement process if the 
hunger strike ended.
The Oceanic Viking arrived in the Riau Islands on 26 October. The weather 
was poor, preventing Indonesian officials from boarding the boat. The 
following day, health practitioners, senior officials from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the National 
Police, and Customs inspected the ship. However, the asylum seekers 
refused to co-operate, rejecting health checks and requests for personal 
details. Indonesian officials made it clear that they were prepared to 
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accommodate the asylum seekers but that Australia had to get them to 
disembark. Australian officers reportedly used force in the 2001 transfer of 
asylum seekers to Nauru, actions which resulted in the temporary cessation 
of operations by its government. When questioned in parliament, Prime 
Minister Rudd refused to rule out a similar use of force on the Oceanic 
Viking. The Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that the 
method for removal was still being negotiated at this time, and the National 
Police commented that the use of force was still an option. It was under this 
cloud of uncertainty that the Oceanic Viking sailed into Sri Bintan Port in the 
Riau Islands’ provincial capital, Tanjung Pinang.
The issue of how the asylum seekers were to be removed was quickly 
overshadowed by other events. The Governor of the Riau Islands, Ismeth 
Abdullah, publicly rejected the decision to allow the Oceanic Viking to 
berth, accusing Australia of treating his province like a dumping ground. 
The Chair of the Regional People’s Representative Council also criticised 
the arrangement, stating that it was ‘humiliating’ for Indonesia. Members 
of the provincial government claimed that they had not been consulted, 
and warned that the President needed to formally inform them of his 
plans for the disembarkation to proceed. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
responded by attempting to allay concerns about the implications of the 
arrangement for the Riau Islands. During the negotiations that followed, 
the Governor conceded to the demands of the central government after 
receiving assurances that the asylum seekers would leave the Oceanic Viking 
voluntarily; that they would not be allowed to live in the community; and 
that they would not be permitted to stay longer than four weeks. Australia 
had to agree to these arrangements if the 78 asylum seekers were to 
disembark in Indonesia. 
Indonesia and Rudd’s regional strategy for combating people smuggling
Indonesia is a strategic embarkation point for asylum seekers attempting 
to enter Australian territory.3 The Keating government coined the term 
‘secondary movers’ for asylum seekers who do so, noting that they do not 
fear political persecution in Indonesia, and so should be seen differently 
to asylum seekers coming directly to Australia. However, it imposed 
mandatory detention for both secondary movers and other unauthorised 
arrivals while their claims to refugee status were processed. The Howard 
government maintained this policy, and introduced temporary protection 
visas for those who qualified, sending a message to other ‘queue jumpers’ 
that asylum seekers needed to apply for visas in third countries or enter 
Australia through an immigration checkpoint to have any chance of 
obtaining permanent residence or citizenship. This policy was changed by 
the Rudd government in recognition of the principle that asylum seekers, 
if found to be refugees, should have access to permanent protection visas 
regardless of the method by which they entered Australian territory. 
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Prime Minister Rudd decided to maintain the Howard government’s 
excision of Australian territory from the migration zone in order to minimise 
the attractiveness of the sea route through Indonesia. That excision removes 
all islands that form part of northern Queensland, the Northern Territory 
and Western Australia, as well as island territories in the Indian Ocean. 
Any asylum seekers who land in these excised territories are deemed to 
be ‘offshore entry persons’. The express purpose of the excision is to deny 
people landing in these areas automatic access to Australian systems for 
processing claims for settlement under the Refugee and Humanitarian 
Program, and to the Australian courts, where applicants can challenge 
rejected applications. Offshore entry persons are required to undergo the 
non-statutory Refugee Status Assessment which determines whether they 
will be granted access to the onshore system. While onshore applicants 
are held in detention centres on the mainland, offshore asylum seekers are 
detained on Christmas Island, an offshore territory host to an AUD 400 
million detention facility. Decisions concerning both groups should be made 
within 90 days of arrival. Unsuccessful asylum seekers are deported and 
successful applicants typically receive permanent protection in Australia. 
Indonesia’s participation in Australia’s regional response to asylum seekers 
was key to the Rudd government’s border protection program and a 
cornerstone of its asylum seeker policy. The Rudd government earmarked 
aid in the form of patrol boats, surveillance aircraft and communications 
equipment to expand Indonesia’s ability to detect and disrupt people 
smuggling within its jurisdiction. Australia also provided financial 
assistance to expand the capacity of Indonesia’s detention facilities to hold 
secondary movers. The densest concentration of these detention facilities 
can be found along the Strait of Malacca and on the north coast of Java. The 
majority of detainees in these areas come from Afghanistan, Iraq and Sri 
Lanka; have arrived via Malaysia; and plan either to stay in Indonesia or 
move onto Australia. Immigration law in Indonesia stipulates two months’ 
imprisonment for unlawful entry. However, asylum seekers spend much 
longer in detention facilities partly because of the time it takes to establish 
their identities. An official at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur 
explained that immigration authorities were formerly relaxed about the 
detention of asylum seekers, allowing them to move and even make a 
living in the local community despite it being illegal under Indonesian 
law. As a condition for Australian funding, however, officials responsible 
for operating Indonesia’s detention facilities are required to guarantee the 
detention of asylum seekers until they have either been resettled by the 
UNHCR or deported.
The Australian government has identified the lack of specific laws that apply 
to people smuggling as a core weakness to Indonesia’s ability to control 
the practice within its territory. The handling of the Jaya Lestari’s owner, 
Captain Bram, has been cited as evidence that tougher laws are needed to 
eradicate people smuggling in the region.4 Indonesian courts returned the 
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Jaya Lestari to Bram in spite of the fact that the vessel was used in an attempt 
to smuggle unlawful migrants to Australia. The Rudd government viewed 
this kind of ‘soft response’ to people smuggling as contributing to the scale 
of the practice in the region. As part of its program to address this issue, the 
Australian Federal Police pushed for the establishment of an anti-people 
smuggling unit within the Indonesian National Police, through which they 
can make recommendations for policies to deal with people smugglers more 
harshly. Importantly, however, Australian policy recommendations are not 
always adopted. For example, the Indonesian National Police have resisted 
Australian pressure to use provisions in the anti-trafficking law to discipline 
people smugglers, arguing that people smuggling and human trafficking are 
different crimes.5 
To 2009, Australia had co-ordinated 90 operations to disrupt people 
smuggling in Indonesia, including the Jaya Lestari’s last voyage, which 
received intense coverage during the Oceanic Viking affair. Acting on 
information provided by the Australian Federal Police, Indonesian 
authorities intercepted the vessel while it was still in Indonesian territorial 
waters and forced it to dock. The fact that asylum seekers had refused to 
disembark was considered an internal issue for Indonesia and Rudd ignored 
calls by those on board for Australia to intervene and ensure that their 
claims for refugee status were processed in a timely manner. By contrast, 
the asylum seekers on board the Oceanic Viking were subject to Australian 
processes within Indonesian territory. In deciding to use the regional 
framework built to disrupt people smuggling, the Rudd government was 
attempting to avert further criticism at home that its ‘soft’ approach to 
asylum seekers was responsible for a rise in unauthorised arrivals; but in 
doing so, made the Oceanic Viking case a bilateral issue whose outcome 
would ultimately be decided by both Australian and Indonesian processes.
Having sought to transfer asylum seekers to Indonesian territory, the 
Australian government was forced to engage with Indonesia to solve the 
problem. Asylum seekers’ refusal to disembark without assurances that 
they would be processed in a timely way, combined with Indonesia’s 
ultimate refusal to permit forced removal, meant that the Rudd government 
had to negotiate in ways that it would not have countenanced in other 
circumstances. Rudd affirmed that he would not allow asylum seekers 
to choose where they were processed. However, he promised that the 
Australian government would guarantee maximum processing times to 
entice the asylum seekers to disembark. Asylum seekers holding UNHCR 
documents would be resettled in four weeks—meeting the demands of 
the provincial government in the process. In addition, he guaranteed 
that asylum seekers not yet registered would be processed within twelve 
weeks, in line with international and Australian best practice. Government 
officials in Indonesia have confirmed that by January 2010 almost all asylum 
seekers had been moved on. A few were accepted by Australia, but the 
majority were sent to a UN transit facility in Romania where they awaited 
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resettlement in third countries. Commending Australia for keeping its word, 
Indonesian officials added that the Sri Lankan asylum seekers who had been 
admitted to the same facility nine months before the arrival of the Oceanic 
Viking were still there.
Conclusion
The Oceanic Viking incident demonstrated that it is necessary to have firm 
guidelines concerning the provision of a ‘place of safety’ to asylum seekers 
rescued in the Indian Ocean. The case highlighted a grey area in the de 
facto agreement which has hitherto seen asylum seekers picked up in the 
Indonesian search and rescue zone by privately owned vessels delivered 
to Indonesian ports. Australia’s attempt to do land asylum seekers using a 
government vessel was met with intense resistance by public officials who 
interpreted it as an affront to Indonesian sovereignty. The ensuing crisis 
strained bilateral relations with Indonesia and provided the Liberal-National 
Coalition with ammunition for their claims that the government’s asylum 
seeker policy was flawed. Prime Minister Rudd may have had an agreement 
with the Indonesian President, but the fact remains that Indonesia is not 
signatory to the Search and Rescue Convention, and so had no national legal 
provision to compel the state to offer a ‘place of safety’.
The Rudd government’s experience with the Oceanic Viking revealed 
the limits of bilateral co-operation to protect Australia’s borders against 
unauthorised arrivals. The Indonesian government recognises the 
high premium that Australia puts on border protection in the bilateral 
relationship, and has gone to considerable lengths to respond to Australian 
calls to internally manage people smuggling. However, the events that 
followed the decision to allow the Oceanic Viking to land asylum seekers in 
Indonesia demonstrated that consent of the President alone may not always 
be sufficient to ensure the accommodation of Australian demands. They 
also added pressure on the Australian government to pursue an alternative 
regional policy which did not rely so heavily on Indonesia for regional 
processing.
Ultimately the impasse was resolved when the two governments agreed 
to use a combination of Indonesian, Australian and international processes 
in order to ease the strain this case had put on the bilateral relationship. 
But cases of ambiguous jurisdiction are not always so easily solved. As 
Indonesian bureaucrats involved in the handling of the Oceanic Viking 
explained, in their experience, the term ‘international issue’ is a euphemism 
for ‘nobody’s problem’. Regional solutions do offer a way in which to 
address this ambiguity, and will remain a primary strategy in the Australian 
government’s attempts to ‘stop the boats’. However, as the reaction to 
Prime Minister Gillard’s pre-2010 federal election proposal to seek the 
establishment of a UNHCR facility in Timor-Leste signalled, this route 
promises to be anything but smooth sailing.
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Endnotes
1.	 This account was constructed using interview data, parliamentary minutes, 
articles from the Australian and Indonesian press and government documents.
2.	 A place of safety is defined as a ‘location where rescue operations are 
considered to terminated, and where the survivors’ safety or life is no longer 
threatened, basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can 
be met; and transportation arrangements can be made for the survivors’ next 
or final destination.’ It is not necessarily the closest port. Resolution MSC.167 
(78) was adopted in May 2004 by the Maritime Safety Committee of the 
International Maritime Organization.
3.	 The Australian Federal Police and the Indonesian Embassy in Malaysia 
have identified the Port Klang area to the west of Kuala Lumpur as a major 
transit point for individuals attempting to seek asylum in Australia without 
authorisation to enter.
4.	 With the assistance of Australian intelligence, Bram was arrested in 2001 and 
2007 by the governments of Cambodia and Indonesia for involvement in people 
smuggling. In Cambodia he was released on a technicality. In Indonesia he was 
sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for transporting people he knew to have 
entered the country illegally.
5.	 A senior Indonesian police officer explained that the Australian Federal 
Police are starting to understand the distinction Indonesia makes between 
these crimes, adding that they do indeed need a law that focuses on people 
smuggling, but that it is just one of many laws under consideration in 
parliament.
